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This paper presents the results of a research study of participation in the Accounting 
Standards Board’s (‘the ASB’) standard setting processes.  It replicates studies of a 
similar nature carried out in the US and Australia or in specific contexts (e.g.  
Operating and Financial Review) in the UK.  The study considers the 1,519 
responses to the ASB’s proposals for accounting standards.  Consistent with the 
findings of other studies, the study finds that there is a high level of preparer 
participation in the ASB’s consultation process.  Drawing on Positive Accounting 
Theory to develop its hypotheses, the paper then examines the characteristics of the 
preparer corporations which formally lobbied the ASB.  The research evidence 
supports the hypotheses that those firms who become involved in the lobbying 
process tend to be larger and more highly geared than non-lobbying firms.  The 
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Because half a dozen grasshoppers under a fern make the field ring with their 
importunate chink, whilst thousands of great cattle repose beneath the shadow of the 
British oak, chew the cud and are silent, pray do not imagine that those who make 
the noise are the only inhabitants of the field. 
 
Edmund Burke - Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Accounting Standards Board (‘the ASB’) was established in 1990.  Among its 
objectives is improvement of standards of financial accounting and reporting for the 
benefit of users, preparers and auditors of financial information (ASB, 1991).  The 
Board sets out inter alia to ‘determine what should be incorporated in accounting 
standards based on research, public consultation and careful deliberation about the 
usefulness of the resulting information’ (ASB, 1991, p.  2).  This paper examines the 
characteristics of those who formally involved themselves in the standard-setting 
process of the ASB by making submissions regarding its proposals for accounting 
standards.  In doing so, the paper contributes to a view of the public consultation that 
fashions accounting standards and explores the involvement of the different parties 
who are expected to benefit from accounting standards. 
 
The paper is in four main sections.  The first of these, Section 2, explores the nature 
of power and participation in the standard-setting process, focusing in particular on 
the hypotheses and findings of other studies in the accounting literature.  Several 
studies have found a preponderance of preparers among the participants in the 
standard setting process.  In the light of other research and the stated aims of the 
ASB the paper analyses the participation of various interest groups in the standard-
setting process of the ASB since its inception. 
 
In Section 3, the paper explores motivations for participation and non-participation in 
the standard setting process.  This exploration confirms the preponderance of 
preparer involvement in the ASB’s standard-setting process.  In the light of this 
finding, Section 4 examines the participation of preparers in the context of the 
hypotheses of Positive Accounting Theory regarding firm size and gearing.  The 
paper concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of the research in Section 
5. 
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2. CONCEPTS OF POWER AND ACCOUNTING STANDARD SETTING 
There are broadly two contrasting views on the nature of accounting standard 
setting: the technical view and the political view.  The technical view 
 
sees the problem of choice as essentially one of identifying ‘best’ accounting 
practice .  .  .  which can be solved by the development and application of 
technical rules or concepts of accounting.  (Taylor and Turley, 1986, p.  68) 
 
The political view, on the other hand, argues that the best solution varies from 
person to person and from group to group.  The best alternative is, therefore, a 
relative concept (Kam, 1990) and often depends on the way that proposed standards 
affect personal interests (Mautz, 1974).  Under the political view, policy decisions 
represent choices between conflicting interests which might be better served by 
different practices.  Hence, the setting of accounting standards is a political activity.  
The consequences of such activity involve resource allocation and re-distribution of 
wealth between the constituents or stakeholders of accounting information.   
 
Political choices might not, however, be neutral.  Any analysis of political choices 
must also consider issues of power (Cooper and Sherer, 1984) because, even in 
ostensibly democratic societies, certain groups may wield disproportionate amounts 
of power and influence.  Similarly rule-makers may unduly favour particular groups 
(Underdown and Taylor, 1986, p.  17). 
 
This paper explores the exercise of power in the ASB’s standard-setting process in 
the context of what Lukes (1974) terms the one-dimensional view of power.  The 
one-dimensional view is ‘a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues 
over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express 
policy preferences, revealed by political participation’ (Lukes, 1974, p.  15).  This 
view of power is primarily based on the writings of Dahl (1961), Polsby (1963, 1968), 
Merelman (1968) and Wolfinger (1971). 
 
Previous accounting studies have traditionally been based on a one-dimensional 
view of power.  Submissions on discussion memoranda and exposure drafts are the 
most observable form of lobbying and these have formed the main basis for previous 
lobbying research (Tutticci, Dunstan and Holmes, 1994).  Walker and Robinson 
(1993) document the publication of over twenty such studies since 1980. 
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These studies generally examine the frequency of responses to proposed 
accounting standards (‘frequency studies’) and the extent to which standard setters 
align their accounting standards with the various views expressed (‘alignment 
studies’).  The written submissions on discussion memoranda and exposure drafts of 
corporations are used as evidence of such lobbying. 
 
Many studies have examined the frequency of submissions made by different 
interest groups.  Weetman, Davie and Collins (1996, p.  62) comment that the 
‘common features’ of such studies are that ‘corporate respondents (preparers of 
accounts) comprise from one-third to a half of all respondents by number’ and that 
responses from users of financial statements are generally uncommon. 
 
Studies concerning the Financial Accounting Standards Board (‘the FASB’) have 
found that 50 per cent of all written responses come from preparers of financial 
statements, while less than 10 per cent come from users (Miller, 1985).  An analysis 
of submissions on 30 randomly selected Statements of Financial Accounting 
Standards (‘SFASs’) by Mezias and Chung (1989) in the US found that preparers of 
financial statements write more letters of comment than all other groups combined.  
Tandy and Wilburn (1992) found that 57.9 per cent of all submissions received on 
the FASB’s first 100 statements came from the preparer group.  This figure 
comprises 60.7 per cent of all individual and 34.9 per cent of representative body 
responses.   Academic participation was 2.5 per cent while submissions directly 
representing users amounted to only 1.79 per cent. 
 
The paucity of user responses in the written submissions to standard setting bodies 
has been observed by many studies, for example, Sutton (1984), Tutticci et al., 
(1994) and                  Ó hÓgartaigh and Reilly (1997).  Armstrong (1977) and 
Beresford (1991) note that the user community have been minimal contributors to 
the process.  Weetman et al., (1994, 1996) extend these findings to the UK 
specifically in the context of the ASB’s Operating and Financial Review.  Jack (1991) 
also notes that the debate on accounting practice has been characterised by the lack 
of significant contributions from those whose interests are most directly involved, the 
users of financial statements. 
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This exploratory research does not focus on the group(s), if any, to which the ASB 
may align itself.  It belongs clearly within the ambit of frequency studies as it sets out 
to identify, initially, the participants in the ASB’s standard-setting process.  Having 
identified the main participants in the process, it then goes on to explore the 
characteristics of such participants.  Such a frequency study is however a preamble 
to a potential study (or studies) of alignment.  If frequency of lobbying by any one 
interest group is established, a natural extension is the examination of whether the 
ASB’s accounting standards are aligned to the views of that interest group.  
Furthermore, frequency of involvement, if supported, may create perceptions of 
alignment.  Therefore, the study while looking exclusively at the issue of frequency of 
participation contributes to the establishment of a bridgehead for the potentially more 
difficult study of alignment. 
 
3. PARTICIPATION IN THE ASBS STANDARD-SETTING PROCESS 
The first element of this research attempts to ascertain which interest groups 
participate in the standard setting process.  The research focuses on an empirical 
analysis of the written submissions prepared in response to Discussion Papers 
(‘DPs’) and Financial Reporting Exposure Drafts (‘FREDs’) published by the ASB. 
 
This element of the research examines the number of submissions made to the ASB 
since its inception to the public hearings on goodwill to October 1995 .  Submissions 
on amendments to ASB standards proposed in FREDs 2, 5 and 9 were excluded.  
Thus the submissions of the 1,519 respondents on 21 of the ASB’s projects were 
recorded. 
 
To ascertain the participation of each interest group in the standard setting process, 
responses are classified into 11 categories, according to the nature of their interest 
in financial reporting.  In assessing the affiliation of respondents, consideration was 
given to any explicit statement which identified the capacity in which the submission 
was made and also to the general tone of the submission.   
 
A summary of results is presented in Table 1.  Preparers of financial statements 
accounted for 41 per cent of total responses.  This figure is significantly higher than 
the second most frequent respondent, the accountancy firms, which contributed 21 
per cent of responses.  The lowest responses came from government, the legal 
community, academia and the users of financial statements.  (a chi square test 
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suggests that the number of responses from preparers of financial statements are 
significantly greater (X2=2429.3, d.f.  =10) at a 99% level of confidence.) 
 
Table 1: Constituent involvement in the ASB’s standard setting process  
 
Group Number % 
Preparers of accounts 617 41% 
Representative bodies which represent 
preparers 
112 7% 
Accountancy firms 319 21% 
Accountancy bodies 146 10% 
Mixed preparer/accountancy 3 - 
Mixed preparer/user  39 3% 
Users 124 8% 
Academia 52 3% 
Government 10 1% 
Law 20 1% 
Individuals/affiliation not clear 77 5% 
TOTAL 1,519 100% 
 
The results support the perception that preparers dominate the formal lobbying 
process while users of financial statements present their views only infrequently.  
Preparers and their representatives accounted for 48 per cent of total responses 
while users of financial statements only submitted 8 per cent of responses.   
 
Those users that did submit responses tended to be the suppliers of capital.  User 
respondents comprised investment companies, pension funds, venture capitalists, 
banks, building societies, industrial development boards and tax authorities.  There 
were no responses from trade unions, consumer associations or other public 
representative bodies.   
 
It might be expected that the individuals would comprise a majority of financial 
statement users.  However, only two respondents specifically identified themselves 
as users (these are included in the user group) while 13 individuals were identified as 
accountants.   
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4. CHARACTERISTICS OF PREPARER PARTICIPATION 
The preponderance of preparer involvement established in this research and 
elsewhere leads to further analysis of the characteristics of those who felt moved to 
become involved in the ASB’s standard-setting process (i.e.  predominantly 
preparers).  This section examines the characteristics of the preparer participants in 
the light of these assertions and other suggestions in the literature.      
 
Weetman et.  al.  (1996, p.  74) find evidence that analysts do not expect to be 
influential in the lobbying process since they believe that ‘the preparers of accounts 
hold the key to consensus’.  The perceived incentives for preparers of accounts to 
engage in lobbying activity are great.  Participation choice studies explicitly recognise 
the economic consequences of accounting standards.  Preparers of financial 
statements are more likely to lobby than users because they generally have more to 
lose than users have (Bryant and Mahaney, 1981; Sutton, 1984).  The majority of 
users hold well-diversified asset portfolios (for example, equities / cash / bonds / 
currencies / derivatives).  On the other hand, lack of diversification renders the 
preparer more sensitive to any adverse economic consequences associated with a 
proposed standard.  Sunder (1980) points out that the cost of switching investments 
is still less for a large undiversified investor than it would be for a company to change 
its line of business.  Schalow (1995) comments that most of these participation 
studies are conducted under the auspices of positive accounting theory (PAT). 
 
4.1. Positive Accounting Theory 
Much of the origins and development of PAT is attributed to the work of Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978, 1979, 1986, 1990).  Watts and Zimmerman assume that 
individuals maximise their own expected utilities and that they are innovative and 
creative in doing so (Watts, 1977; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978).  This is the key 
behavioural assumption of PAT and in this way PAT builds upon the principal-agent 
analysis of Jensen and Meckling (1976).  The implication of this assumption is that 
management lobbies on accounting standards in its own self-interest. 
 
Watts and Zimmerman adopt a contracting perspective to determine the factors that 
influence a manager’s decision to lobby on accounting issues.  Many of a firm’s 
contracts are defined in terms of financial reporting information.  The form of 
financial accounting disclosure has the potential to affect some of these contracts, 
for example, capital adequacy ratios, borrowing covenants and management 
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compensation schemes.  This results in an economic impact on the parties involved.  
It is logical to presume that those affected will mobilise their forces to encourage the 
promulgation of statements favourable to them (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978;  Hope 
and Gray, 1982; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).    
 
Specifically, PAT concludes that there are empirical regularities between a firm’s 
decision to lobby on a proposed accounting standard and properties of its debt 
contracts, management compensation contracts and its political visibility.  These are 
discussed below.   
 
4.1.1 Firm size 
The political cost hypothesis states that lobbying companies are, on average, larger 
than non-lobbying companies.  Size is a proxy variable for political visibility (Pacecca, 
1995).  Accounting standards which increase a large firm’s reported earnings have 
economic consequences in that they increase political visibility.  This can impact on a 
company’s bookkeeping and regulatory costs.  It may also lead to increased taxes 
and wage claims, a reduction in subsidies granted or an increased scrutiny by 
monopolies and mergers commissions.  Mansfield (1962) also states that increased 
political visibility may result in increased competition arising from new entrants 
attracted by the accounting profit of the industry.   
 
Numerous empirical studies support the political cost hypothesis, for example, 
Hagerman and Zmijewski, (1979); Bowen, Lacey and Noreen (1981) and Zmijewski 
and Hagerman (1981).  Sutton (1984) uses a theoretical framework to conclude that 
large producers are more likely to lobby than small producers.  This framework is 
based on the suggestion by Downs (1957) that size determines the cost of lobbying 
relative to its benefits.  Francis (1987) uses net sales as a proxy for firm size and 
Saemann (1987) uses total sales and book value of assets.  Both conclude that firm 
size was a significant factor in the decision of firms to lobby on the FASB’s 
Preliminary Views on ‘Employers’ Accounting for Pensions and Other Post 
Employment Benefits’. 
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4.1.2 Debt / equity ratio 
The debt/equity hypothesis posits that lobbying firms tend to have a higher 
debt/equity ratio than non-lobbying firms.  The debt/equity ratio is taken as a proxy 
for the existence and tightness of a firm’s debt covenants (Kalay, 1982).   
 
The tighter a firm’s debt covenant, the greater the probability of a covenant violation 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1990).  Covenant violation results in re-negotiation of debt 
covenants which give rise to contracting costs.  Similarly future capital may become 
more expensive to obtain.  Higher than normal gearing ratios may also result in a 
restriction on the ability of the firm to raise new capital or a fall in stock or bond 
ratings. 
 
Again, numerous studies support this hypothesis.  For example, in an analysis of 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 8 issued by the FASB, Griffin 
(1982) confirmed that lobbying companies tended to be larger and more highly 
geared than non-lobbying companies.  The determinants of lobbying behaviour 
according to Dhaliwal (1982) include firm size and capital structure.  Christie (1990) 
concluded that firm leverage was a significant variable in the decision of managers to 
lobby accounting standards boards.   
 
Positive accounting research and studies deriving from such research provide some 
evidence of a systematic association between the corporate decision to lobby and 
the variables that proxy for economic incentives including firm size, gearing and 
bonus plans. 
 
4.2 Research Method 
This paper seeks to ascertain the relevance of these variables, specifically those 
relating to firm size and gearing, to the ASB.  Such a study involves a 
comprehensive empirical analysis of the formal submissions made to the ASB on 
their various discussion memoranda.  It also contains an analysis of the 
characteristics of the corporate respondents in an attempt to discover a link between 
these characteristics and their propensity to become involved in the standard setting 
process.  Drawing on previous studies in the area as discussed above, the research 
hypotheses may be expressed as follows: 
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H1 : The larger the company, as measured by its average turnover, the greater the 
probability that the company submitted a written response to the ASB.   
 
H2 : The greater the debt to equity ratio of a company, the greater the probability 
that the company submitted a written response to the ASB.   
Hence, the objective of this study is to determine if lobbying firms tend to be larger 
and more highly geared than their non-lobbying counterparts. 
 
This necessitates the use of variables which represent size and debt covenants.  
Company size is used as a proxy for political costs and company turnover is used to 
measure firm size.  This is the approach adopted by Francis (1987), Saemann 
(1987) and Schalow (1995). 
 
A company’s gearing ratio is taken as the proxy for the closeness of the observed 
gearing ratio to the maximum ratio prescribed in a contract to raise long-term debt 
(after Dhaliwal (1982) and Deakin (1989)).  This, in turn, is taken as a proxy for the 
expected value of the costs which arise from any restrictions imposed upon the 
company under its debt contracts. 
 
The analysis is based on financial information obtained from Dun & Bradstreet’s 
Corporate Financial Performance: Britain’s top 50,000 companies (Dun & Bradstreet, 
1994, Vols 1 and 2) for the years 1991 to 1994 inclusive.   
 
Therefore, a firm was included in the study if it  
 
 was UK incorporated,  
 submitted at least one written response to an ASB discussion paper or 
exposure draft issued between 1991 and 1994 (as this is the period for which 
the Dun & Bradstreet financial information is used), if this submission became 
part of the public record (these ASB documents are listed in Table 2: these 
are a subset of the ASB projects noted earlier: ASB proposals issued after 
1994 are excluded as the period of this study is 1991 to 1994), and,  
 if the company formed part of the Times 1000 1995 compiled by Extel 
Financial (1994).   
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Table 2 - ASB statements included in study of preparer involvement  
 
ASB STATEMENT ISSUE DATE 
Statement of Principles - Chapters 1 and 2 July 1991 
FRED 1 December 1991 
Statement of Principles - Chapter 6 December 1991 
DP - Accounting for Capital Instruments December 1991 
Operating and Financial Review (OFR) April 1992 
FRED 3 December 1992 
FRED 4 February 1993 
DP - Role of Valuation in Financial Reporting March 1993 
DP - Fair Values in Acquisition Accounting April 1993 
FRED 6 May 1993 
DP - Goodwill December 1993 
FRED 7 December 1993 
FRED 8 March 1994 
Review of FRS 1 June 1994 
DP - Associates and Joint Ventures July 1994 
Consultative Document on Exemption of Small Companies November 1994 
 
A total of 108 firms fulfilled all three conditions.  An average of each company’s 
turnover and gearing ratio for three financial years covering the time period 1991 to 
1994 was calculated.  Gearing is defined as long-term debt divided by long-term debt 
plus shareholders’ funds and is expressed as a percentage.  Long-term debt is debt 
due for payment after more than one year.   
 
To determine the similarity of turnover and gearing characteristics of non-lobbyists, a 
sample of 108 firms that did not submit any responses to the ASB were selected  
haphazardly from the Times 1000 list for 1995.  Similar turnover and gearing figures 
were also obtained for these firms. 
 
4.3 Research results 
The 108 companies that lobbied the ASB were compared with the sample of non-
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Mean Turnover £2,808,153,000 £354,984,000 
Gearing 38.34% 23.68% 
 
The mean and standard deviation of each sample was calculated.  As can be seen 
from Table 3, the average turnover of firms who lobbied the ASB was approximately 
ST£2.808 billion compared to ST£355 million for non-lobbyists.  Lobbyists also 
tended to more highly geared.  The average gearing ratio for lobbyists was 38.34% 
and 23.68% for non-lobbyists.   
 
In order to determine the significance of the differences between the two means, a 
two-tailed hypothesis test was performed.  The test returns t-scores of 6.73 and 5.34 
for sales and gearing respectively.  Both of these figures are significant at a 99 per 
cent level of confidence.  The evidence therefore supports the hupotheses that 
lobbyists to the ASB tend to be larger and more highly geared than non-lobbyists.   
 
If ranking in the Times 1000 (rather than turnover) is used as a measure of size, 
corporate responses comprised 134 members of the Times 1000 companies for 
1995 (Extel Financial, 1994).  This represents a 13.4 per cent relative response rate.  
Out of the top 50,000 companies in the UK, only 214 companies responded to the 
ASB.  This amounts to a 0.428 per cent relative response.  These findings further 
suggest that a higher percentage of those corporations that become part of the 
ASB’s lobbying process are larger firms. 
 
Most corporate respondents appeared to participate in the ASB’s standard setting 
process on a selective basis.  For example, only 2% (or 13) of corporate respondents 
(totalling 617) responded to more than 10 of the ASB’s proposals.  Most responses 
were to only one of the proposals with the Discussion Paper Accounting for Tax 
attracting most response.  This is consistent with the results of research by Brown 
(1981).  Brown’s US-based study found that only 27 respondents commented on at 
least seven of the nine FASB projects analysed.  The 27 respondents consisted of 
the Big 8 public accounting firms, nine industrial firms, nine representative 
organisations and one government agency.  This is also consistent with the 
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suggestion that the economic consequences of standards will affect some firms 
more than others and this effect will vary from standard to standard. 
 
Table 4:  Reporting entities / preparers becoming involved more than 10 times in the 
standard setting process 
 
Reporting entity No. of 
responses 
(max. 21) 
British Gas plc 16 
Grand Metropolitan plc 16 
Guinness plc 16 
BAT Industries plc 15 
Boots Company plc 13 
British Petroleum plc 11 
Cadbury Schweppes plc 11 
ICI 11 
Post Office 11 
Royal Dutch / Shell Group 11 
Sedgwick Group plc 11 
Unilever 11 
SmithKline Beecham plc 10 
 
Furthermore, Table 4 lists the individuals or organisations who responded to ten or 
more of the ASB’s statements.  These respondents comprise thirteen corporations 
(5.3% of the 245 preparers of financial statements who became formally involved at 
least once in the standard setting process).  With the exception of Sedgwick Group 
plc, all corporations are ranked in the top 50 of the Times 1000.  This would further 
suggest that large firms lobby more consistently than smaller firms. 
 
These findings are consistent with those elsewhere in the literature.  As discussed 
earlier, the central propositions of PAT are that those firms with higher turnover have 
a higher visibility and that the benefits of intervention for such reporting entities 
outweigh the costs.  Firm size in this instance is taken as a proxy for political costs.  
Similarly debt covenants are assumed to be of more concern for those firms with 
higher gearing and, as a result, such firms are assumed to have a greater interest in 
the effects of accounting standards than firms which have a lower gearing.  The 
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results confirm both of these propositions in a similar manner to the results of, for 
example, Francis (1987), Tutticci et al.  (1994) and Pacecca (1995).   
 
The potential limitations of this research include its subjectivity and its one-
dimensional focus.  An important limitation of studies such as this is the subjectivity 
involved in the classification of responses.  Furthermore, there may be overlap 
between a respondent’s role.  Many respondents may be users (for example for 
credit and / or investment decisions) as well as preparers of financial statements.  
They are classified in this study in according to the group to which they primarily 
belong. 
 
The research focuses on one dimension of lobbying:  formal written submissions on 
discussion memoranda.  It thereby excludes other methods of lobbying from the 
analysis.  The notion of ‘participation’ in this instance comprises a formal submission 
to the ASB.  This usage is consistent with that of other studies such as Weetman et 
al.  (1996), Schalow (1995) and Francis (1987).  However, written submissions to 
accounting standards boards represent a relatively late and insignificant part of the 
overall political process.  Earlier stages include contests over the composition of the 
standards boards themselves and the overall structure of regulatory arrangements 
(Walker and Robinson, 1993).   
 
Accounting data are used in the assessment of firm size and gearing.  Such data 
must be treated cautiously as they are accompanied by the inherent limitations of 
accounting data including historical cost and potential differences in accounting 
policies.  There is little reason to believe however in the context of this study that the 




This paper presents evidence to confirm that users of financial statements do not 
participate to any great extent in the UK standard setting process.  Their presence 
has been overshadowed by the preparers of financial statements who, together with 
their representatives, account for almost half of all formal submissions made to the 
ASB documents reviewed in this study.   
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The study examined the characteristics of these respondents, using PAT as a 
research framework.  It was found that lobbying corporations in the UK tend to be 
larger and more highly geared than non-lobbying corporations.  This implies that 
managers are, in fact, more concerned with the impact of accounting standards on 
political costs and debt-covenants and, hence, the economic consequences of the 
proposed standard to their firm.   
 
The implications of these findings for the ASB are that it may be hearing only a 
particular view of its proposals for accounting standards, a view that is tempered by 
the nature of its respondents.  The high level of preparer participation in the standard 
setting process also suggests that the ASB may be hearing more about the cost of 
implementation of accounting standards to preparers than about their benefits to 
users.  Its objective of fashioning standards for the benefit of users, preparers and 
auditors of financial information (ASB, 1991) in the heat of public consultation may 
be circumscribed in the light of the limited ‘public’ which demands access to its 
deliberations.   
 
DCU Business School 
Research Paper Series 




Accounting Standards Board,  1991.  Statement of Aims,  London: ASB 
 
Accounting Standards Board,  1994.  Submissions on FRED 7 - Fair Values in 
Acquisition Accounting,  London; ASB 
 
Armstrong, M., A.,  1977.  ‘The politics of establishing accounting standards’.  
Journal of Accountancy,  February,  pp.  76-79 
 
Ball, R.  and C.  W.  Smith, Jr.,  1992.  The Economics of Accounting Policy Choice,  
New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.   
 
Beresford, D.  R.,  1991.  ‘Standard Setting Process in Trouble (Again)’,  Accounting 
Horizons,  June,  pp.  94 – 96 
 
Booth, P.  and N.  Cocks,  1990.  ‘Critical research issues in accounting standard 
setting’.  Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,  Vol.  17,  No.  4,  Autumn,  
pp.  511-528 
 
Bowen, R.,  J.  Lacey, and E.  Noreen,  1981.  ‘Determinants of the decision by firms 
to capitalize interest costs’.  Journal of Accounting and Economics,  August, pp.  
151-179 
 
Brown, P.  R., 1981.  ‘A Descriptive Analysis of Select Input Bases of the FASB’.  
Journal of Accounting Research,  Vol.  19,  No.  1,  Spring,  pp.  232-246 
 
Brown, P.  R.,  1982.  ‘FASB Responsiveness to Corporate Input’.  Journal of 
Accounting Auditing and Finance,  Summer,  pp.  282-290 
 
Bryant, M., and M.  C.  Mahaney,  1981.  ‘The Politics of Standard Setting’.  
Management Accounting,  Vol.  62,  No.  9,  March,  pp.  26-33 
 
Christie, A.  A., 1990.  ‘Aggregation of Test Statistics: An Evaluation of the Evidence 
on Contracting and Size Hypotheses’.  Journal of Accounting and Economics,  Vol.  
12,  pp.  15-36 
DCU Business School 
Research Paper Series 
Paper No. 29 
17 
 
Cooper, D., and M.  J.  Sherer,  1984.  ‘The Value of Corporate Accounting Reports: 
Arguments for a Political Economy of Accounting’.  Accounting, Organisations and 
Society,  Vol.  9,  No.  3/4,  pp.  207-232 
 
Dahl, R.  A., 1961.  Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City,  New 
Haven: Yale University Press 
 
Dahl, R.  A.,  1976.  Modern Political Analysis,  New jersey: Prentice-Hall 
 
Dhaliwal, D.  S.,  1982.  ‘Some Economic Determinants of Management Lobbying for 
Alternative Methods of Accounting: Evidence from the Accounting for Interest Costs 
Issue’.  Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,  Summer 
 
Deakin, E.B., 1989.  ‘Rational Economic Behavior and Lobbying on Accounting 
Issues: Evidence from the Oil and Gas Industry’, The Accounting Review, Vol.  64, 
pp.  137-151. 
 
Downs, A., 1957.  An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Dun & Bradstreet International,  1994.  Corporate Financial Performance - Britain’s 
top 50,000 companies,  Bucks: Dun & Bradstreet Ltd.,  Vol.  1 - A – J 
 
Dun & Bradstreet International,  1994.  Corporate Financial Performance - Britain’s 
top 50,000 companies,  Bucks: Dun & Bradstreet Ltd.,  Vol.  2 -K-Z 
 
Extel Financial,  1994.  The Times 1000,  London: Times Books 
 
Francis, J.  R.,  1987.  ‘Lobbying Against Proposed Accounting Standards: The Case 
of Employers’ Pension Accounting’.  Journal of Accounting & Public Policy,  Vol.  6,  
Issue 1,  Spring,  pp.  35-57 
 
Gavens, J.  J., G.  D.  Carnegie, and R.  W.  Gibson,  1989.  ‘Company participation 
in the Australian accounting standards setting process’.  Accounting and Finance,  
November, pp.  47-58 
 
DCU Business School 
Research Paper Series 
Paper No. 29 
18 
Griffin, P.  A.,  1982.  ‘Foreign Exchange Gains and Losses: Impact on Reported 
Earnings’.  Abacus,  Vol.  18,  No.  1,  pp.  50-69 
 
Hagerman, R.  and M.  Zmijewski,  1979.  ‘Some economic determinants of 
accounting policy choice’.  Journal of Accounting and Economics,  April,  pp.  141-
161 
 
Hope, T.  and J.  Briggs,  1982.  ‘Accounting policy making - some lessons from the 
deferred taxation debate’.  Accounting and Business Research,  Spring,  pp.  83-96 
 
Hope, T.  and R.  Gray,  1982.  ‘Power and Policy Making: The Development of an 
R&D Standard’.  Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,  Vol.  9,  No.  4,  April,  
pp.  531-558 
 
Jack, A.  1991.  ‘Investors pipe up’.  Financial Times,  September 3,  p.  16 
 
Jensen, M., and W.H.  Meckling, 1976.  ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, No.  3, pp.  
305-360. 
 
Kalay, A.  1982.  ‘Stockholder-bondholder conflict and dividend constraints’.  Journal 
of Financial Economics,  July,  pp.  211-233 
 
Kam, V.  1990.  Accounting Theory,  2nd.  Ed.  New York: Wiley 
 
Lukes, S.  1974.  Power: A Radical View,  London: Macmillan 
 
Mansfield, E.,  1962.  ‘Entry, Gibrat’s Law, Innovation and the Growth of Firms’.  The 
American Economic Review,  No.  42,  pp.  479-492 
 
Mautz, R.  K.,  1974.  ‘The Other Accounting Standards Board’.   The Journal of 
Accountancy,  February,  pp.  56-60 
 
Mezias, S.J.  and H.  Chung, 1989.  Due Process and Participation at the FASB, 
Morristown, NJ: Financial Executives Research Foundation. 
 
DCU Business School 
Research Paper Series 
Paper No. 29 
19 
Merelman, R.  M., 1968.  ‘On the Neo-elitist Critique of Community Power’.  
American Political Science Review,  pp.  451-460. 
 
Miller, P.,  1985.  ‘Too Much Preparer Dominance in Standards Setting’.  The 
Chartered Accountant in Australia.  Vol.  56,  No.  5,  November,  pp.  28-30 
 
Morris, R.  D.,  1986.  ‘Lobbying on proposed accounting standards’.  The Chartered 
Accountant in Australia,  Vol.  56,  No.  8,  March 
 
ÓhÓgartaigh, C.  and E.  Reilly,  1997.  ‘Perceptions of Performance: The Reactions 
of Analysts and Institutional Investors to FRS 3’, The Irish Accounting Review, vol.  
4, Spring, pp.  124-143 
 
Pacecca, T.,  1995.  ‘An Analysis of Submissions to the ASRB on Release 411 
‘Foreign Currency Translation’.  Accounting and Finance,  Vol.  35,  No.  2,  
November,  pp.  98-116 
 
Polsby, N.  W.,  1963.  Community Power and Political Theory,  New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press 
 
Polsby, N.  W.,  1968.  ‘Community: The Study of Community Power’, International 
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol.  3, New York: Macmillan and Free Press. 
 
Renshall, M.  1990.  ‘The Economics and Politics of Standard Setting’ in Standard 
Setting for Financial Reporting: An International Conference Sponsored by the 
American Accounting Association with Klynveld Main Goerdeler   
 
Saemann, G.P.,  1987.  ‘A model of NYSE manager position and participation choice 
on the March 1985 FASB ED: Employers’ Accounting for Pensions’.  Doctoral 
Dissertation,  Michigan State University 
 
Saemann, G.  P.  1995.  ‘The accounting standard -setting due process, corporate 
consensus, and FASB responsiveness: Employers’ Accounting for Pensions’.  
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance,  Vol.  10,  No.  3,  Summer,  pp.  555-
564 
 
DCU Business School 
Research Paper Series 
Paper No. 29 
20 
Schalow, C.M.  1995.  ‘Participation Choice: The Exposure Draft for Postretirement 
Benefits Other Than Pensions’.  Accounting Horizons,  Vol.  9,  No.  1,  March,  pp.  
24-41 
 
Sunder, S.,  1980.  ‘Towards a Theory of Accounting Choice: Private and Social 
Decisions’.  Working Paper,  University of Chicago 
 
Sutton, T.  G.,  1984.  ‘Lobbying of Accounting Standard-Setting Bodies in the UK 
and the USA: A Downsian Analysis’.  Accounting, Organisations and Society,  Vol.  
9,  No.  1,  pp.  81-95 
 
Tandy, P.  R.  and N.  L.  Wilburn,  1992.  ‘Constituent Participation in Standard-
Setting: The FASB’s First 100 Statements’.  Accounting Horizons,  Vol.  6,  Issue 2,  
June,  pp.  47-58 
 
Taylor, P.  and S.  Turley,  1986.  The Regulation of Accounting.  Oxford: Blackwell 
Tutticci, I., K.  Dunstan and S.  Holmes,  1994.  ‘Respondent lobbying in the 
Australian accounting standard-setting process: ED49 - A case study’.  Accounting 
Auditing and Accountability Journal,  Vol.  7,  Issue 2,  pp.  86-104 
 
Underdown, B.  & P.  Taylor,  (1986).  Accounting Theory & Policy Making,  London : 
Heinemann 
 
Walker, R.  G.,  1987.  ‘Australia’s ASRB.  A Case Study of Political Activity and 
Regulatory ‘Capture’’.  Accounting and Business Research,  Vol.  17,  No.  67,  
Summer,  pp.  269-286 
 
Walker, R.  G., and S.  P.  Robinson,  1993.  ‘A Critical Assessment of the Literature 
on Political Activity and Accounting Regulation’.  Research in Accounting Regulation,  
Vol.  7,  pp.  3-40 
 
Watts, R.  L.,  1977.  ‘Corporate Financial Statements, A Product of the Market and 
Political Processes’.  Australian Journal of Management,  No.  2,  pp.  53-75 
 
DCU Business School 
Research Paper Series 
Paper No. 29 
21 
Watts, R.  L., and J.  L.  Zimmerman,  1978.  ‘Towards a Positive Theory of the 
Determination of Accounting Standards’.  The Accounting Review,  Vol.  LIII,  No.  1,  
January,  pp.  112-134 
 
Watts, R.  L., and J.  L.  Zimmerman,  1979.  ‘The demand for and supply of 
accounting theories: The market for excuses’.  The Accounting Review,  April,  pp.  
273-305 
 
Watts, R.  L., and J.  L.  Zimmerman,  1986.  Positive Accounting Theory,  
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:  Prentice-Hall 
 
Watts, R.  L., and J.  L.  Zimmerman,  1990.  ‘Positive Accounting Theory, A Ten 
Year Perspective’.  The Accounting Review,  No.  65,  pp.  131-156 
 
Weetman, P.,  B.  Collins and E.  Davie,  1994.  Operating and Financial Review: 
Views of Analysts and Institutional Investors,  Edinburgh: The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotland 
 
Weetman, P.,  E.  S.  Davie and W.  Collins,  1996.  ‘Lobbying on Accounting Issues: 
Preparer/user imbalance in the case of the Operating and Financial Review’.  
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal,  Vol.  9,  No.  1,  pp.  59-76 
 
Wolfinger, R.  E., 1971.  ‘Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics’.  American 
Political Science Review,  pp.  1063-1080 
 
Yap, C., L.,  1994.  ‘Cash flow statements: The Australian experience’.  Advances in 
International Accounting,  Vol.  6,  pp.  165-183 
 
Zmijewski, M.  and R.  Hagerman,  1981.  ‘An income strategy approach to the 
positive theory of accounting standard setting/choice’.  Journal of Accounting and 
Economics,  August, pp.  129-149. 
 
 
 
